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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
SCHOHARIE COUNTY LOCAL 848, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16989 
COUNTY OF SCHOHARIE, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAMELA BAISLEY of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
ROEMER, WALLENS & MINEAUX, LLP (LIESL K. ZWICKLBAUER Of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of 
Schoharie (County) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALT) on a charge filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Schoharie County 
Local 848 (CSEA). CSEA alleges in its charge that the County 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it unilaterally substituted two, part-time social 
services investigators after it eliminated a vacant, full-time 
investigator position.^ 
After a hearing, the ALJ held that the charge was timely 
filed and that the County had refused to negotiate as alleged. 
Full-time and part-time investigators are in CSEA's unit. 
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The County excepts to both the ALJ's timeliness and merits 
determinations. On timeliness, the County argues that as CSEA 
knew of the position substitution by at least March 22, 1995, its 
August 3, 1995 charge is plainly untimely having been filed after 
the four-month-7 filing period expired. On the merits, the 
County argues that its decision to substitute two, part-time 
investigators after the full-time line item was eliminated did 
not violate the Act because it was unable to fill the vacancy in 
the full-time position, its substitution of part-time 
investigators represented a change in job qualifications, and its 
services to the public improved with the appointment of part-time 
investigators. 
CSEA argues in response to the exceptions that the ALJ's 
decision is correct and should be affirmed. As to timeliness, 
CSEA argues that the four-month filing period runs, at the 
earliest, from early April when it knew that the second part-time 
investigator had been appointed. On the merits, CSEA argues that 
the substitution of part-time employees in positions created 
simultaneously with the elimination of the full-time position 
was, as the ALJ held, a mandatorily negotiable decision. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties7 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision that the charge was 
timely filed. 
2/Rules of Procedure §204.1(a) (1) . 
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The ALJ held that the time for filing this charge did not 
begin to run until CSEA knew that the substitution of part-time 
positions was without any change in service because it was not 
"injured" until then within the meaning of Middle Country 
Teachers Association (hereafter Middle Country).^ The ALT 
further held that CSEA could not know there was not a service 
change until the second part-time employee actually began working 
because until then it could not know with certainty that two 
employees in the part-time positions would fully replace the 
former full-time employee in terms of hours of work and job 
duties. 
We are persuaded on the facts of this case, however, that 
CSEA knew to a certainty by at least the date the first part-time 
employee was appointed that the County had substituted two part-
time employees to continue services previously rendered by the 
full-time employee unchanged in any relevant respect. 
Even if we, as did the ALJ, were to treat the Board of 
Supervisors' mid-March 1995 resolution abolishing the full-time 
position and creating in its place two part-time positions, and 
Commissioner of Social Services Judith Maier's contemporaneous 
statements urging that action, as merely an announcement of an 
intention to act at a future date, implementation of that 
-'21 PERB 53012 (1988) . Middle Country permits a charge to be 
filed within four months of either the announcement of an act to 
take place in the future or the date the announced decision is 
first implemented and injures the charging party's rights under 
the Act. 
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announcement within the meaning of Middle Country occurred when 
the first part-time investigator was appointed to CSEA's 
knowledge on March 22, 1995. 
CSEA had in March 1995 the minutes of the Board of 
Supervisors' meeting held that month at which Maier requested the 
abolition of the full-time investigator position and the creation 
of two part-time lines to take advantage of an "opportunity" 
which had "surfaced" to remedy a staffing problem in her 
department. At that meeting, Maier told the members of the Board 
of Supervisors that there were then "two people interested in the 
job and both are willing to work part time" and that those two 
persons were "not interested in the fringes that would go with 
full-time employments. . . . " In response to a question from a 
member of the Board of Supervisors as to whether there would be 
space available for two employees, Maier responded that space was 
"not a problem" because the "two investigators can share a desk 
as they would not necessarily be at the office at the same time". 
From the minutes of the Board of Supervisors' meeting, CSEA 
had to have known that the appointment of two part-time employees 
was an imminent certainty which had been finalized in specific 
detail. There is nothing in the statements made by the 
Commissioner to suggest even the slightest possibility that the 
appointments of these two individuals to part-time positions 
would not be made. Moreover, those minutes clearly revealed to 
CSEA that the two part-time investigators would have the same 
duties and would provide the same services as the full-time 
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investigator. The only question left after the Board of 
Supervisors' meeting and the appointment of the first part-time 
investigator was not whether the second part-time position would 
be filled, only when. Against the statements made by Maier at 
the County Board of Supervisors' meeting and the actual 
appointment "'of the first part-time investigator, the appointment 
of the second part-time employee in April can be viewed only as 
the ministerial completion of a decision announced and 
implemented to CSEA's legal injury with the first appointment in 
March. Once the first part-time employee was appointed, CSEA had 
to have known that the second appointment, mirroring the first, 
would effect the equal distribution of the hours and duties of 
the former full-time investigator. 
The time to file the charge might have been postponed to the 
date CSEA learned of the second employee's appointment if there 
was any reason for it to believe either that the second 
appointment might not be made, or that it would be materially 
different in terms of hours or duties from the first part-time 
appointment. On the facts of the this case, however, the 
appointment of the second part-time employee to a position 
equivalent to the first part-time position was never in doubt. 
Any uncertainty as to the precise date at which the second part-
time employee would be appointed or would actually begin working 
is of no consequence on these facts in defining the elements of 
this type of improper practice charge and of no relevance to an 
assessment•of the timeliness of the charge actually filed. 
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To find the charge in this case to have been timely filed, 
we would have to conclude that even the remotest possibility that 
the second part-time position would not be filled or would be 
filled differently from the first was sufficient to permit CSEA 
to wait to file its charge until that second position was 
actually filled, even though on this record no reasonable doubt 
existed as to the appointment of that second part-time individual 
or the terms of that appointment. The ALJ's analysis of 
timeliness would create an undefined and open-ended filing 
period, one never closing until a charging party was certain 
there were no defenses (e.g. no service changes) which could be 
offered by a respondent in defense of any improper practice 
charge filed against it. Such a result is not required or 
warranted under Middle Country and we do not believe that the 
policies of the Act would be advanced by such a timeliness 
determination resting on little more than a theory that the 
County might have changed its mind. To move the filing period to 
a point which focuses on the imprecise date by which a charging 
party is satisfied that there is no defense to the statutory 
violation alleged will serve only to prolong the resolution of 
labor disputes to the ultimate detriment of the parties' 
relationships and the policies of the Act. 
For the reasons set forth above, the charge is dismissed as 
untimely filed. The County's exceptions in that regard are 
granted and the ALJ's decision is reversed. As the charge is 
dismissed on this ground, we do not reach the issue of whether 
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the change made by the County in substituting part-time positions 
or employees for the full-time position or employee was 
mandatorily negotiable or whether that action violated the Act. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
J/-, 1Ukyv4 k^-Paul in^, Ri Kinse l ' l a , Chai rperson 
Marc A. Abbott , Member 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE 
VILLAGE OF WALDEN, NEW YORK STATE UNION OF 
POLICE ASSOCIATIONS, INC., LOCAL 8, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16443 
VILLAGE OF WALDEN, 
Respondent. 
KENNETH J. FRANZBLAU, ESQ., for Charging Party 
VINCENT TOOMEY, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Village of 
Walden (Village) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) on a charge filed against the Village by the Patrolmen's 
Benevolent Association of the Village of Walden, New York State 
Union of Police*Associations, Inc., Local 8 (PBA). The PBA 
alleges, and the ALJ held, that the Village violated §209-a.l(d) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
discontinued contractual fringe benefits-7 for unit employees on 
General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c leave of absence.27 
-^Included were vacations, holidays, personal leave, bereavement 
leave, sick leave, uniform allowance and overtime. 
^GML §207-c provides for the payment of wages or salary to 
police officers who are disabled by injury or illness suffered in 
the line of duty and for their medical treatment. 
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The ALJ held on a stipulated record that the charge was 
within the agency's jurisdiction, that the discontinued fringe 
benefits were mandatory subjects of negotiation and that 
negotiations had not been waived by a provision in the parties' 
contractual grievance procedure which states that "all past 
practices may be continued at the Village's discretion." 
The Village argues in its exceptions that the ALJ's 
jurisdiction and waiver holdings are each in error. The PBA 
argues in response that both determinations are correct. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's jurisdictional determination but 
reverse on the merits. 
As to the jurisdictional issue, this charge would ordinarily 
lend itself to a simple analysis. The benefits which were 
discontinued by the Village are admittedly contractual in nature. 
Police officers on GML §207-c leave of absence are unit 
employees. The parties' contract covers all unit employees. The 
contract does not exempt disabled police officers from 
eligibility for any contractual benefits, although it does exempt 
part-time unit employees. Therefore, the contract would appear 
to be a reasonably arguable source of right to the PBA with 
respect to the disabled police officers' entitlement to the 
receipt of the contractual fringe benefits in issue, a 
circumstance which would trigger the jurisdictional limitations 
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in §205.5(d)-7 and the jurisdictional deferral policies 
developed thereunder.-7 That analysis is, however, as the ALT 
recognized, complicated both because the parties have stipulated 
that these benefits were extended to GML §207-c employees 
pursuant to a "long-standing practice", not pursuant to their 
contract, and because of the Court of Appeals' decision in 
Chalachan v. City of Bincrhamton-7 (hereafter Chalachan) 
regarding the existence of a contractual cause of action in 
circumstances comparable to those here. 
In Chalachan, the question was whether disabled fire 
fighters absent from work pursuant to GML §207-a were entitled 
under their collective bargaining agreement to payment for unused 
vacation time. Affirming the Appellate Division,^ the Court of 
Appeals held that the disabled fire fighters had a statutory 
entitlement to the compensation rights provided them by GML 
§207-a, but "any additional benefits must be expressly provided 
for in the agreement, and petitioners' argument that they are 
entitled to unused vacation benefits by reason of the absence of 
language specifically excluding their class from vacation 
5/Countv of Nassau, 23 PERB 53051 (1990) . 
^County of Onondacra and Sheriff of Onondaga County, 30 PERB 
53036 (1997); Town of Carmel, 29 PERB 53073 (1996) ; Herkimer 
County BOCES. 20 PERB 53050 (1987). 
^55 N.Y.2d 989 (1982), aff'q 81 A.D.2d 973 (3d Dep't 1981). 
-''The decision at the Appellate Division had two judges 
dissenting and voting to sustain the fire fighters' contractual 
entitlement to payment for accrued vacation time. 
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benefits is thus without merit."-7 As relevant to the issues 
before us, there is no distinction between disabled fire fighters 
absent from work under GML §207-a and disabled police officers 
absent from work under GML §207-c. 
The parties' contract here, as in Chalachan, does not 
expressly grant disabled police officers any of the fringe 
benefits which were eliminated by the Village. This charge 
would, therefore, appear to be within our jurisdiction as a 
matter of law because Chalachan seems to extinguish any 
possibility for a contractual cause of action in these 
circumstances. However, in County of Schenectady v. Kelleher 
(hereafter Kelleher),& the Appellate Division, Third 
) Department, which had also issued Chalachanf held that Chalachan 
does not extinguish a contractual cause of action "in an absolute 
sense", even in circumstances in which the collective bargaining 
agreement does not expressly provide the disabled police officers 
with an entitlement to the particular fringe benefit withheld 
from them. In Kelleher, the Court denied a stay of arbitration 
and allowed an arbitrator to decide whether disabled correction 
officers were entitled contractually to medical and dental 
insurance despite the absence of an "express" entitlement to 
those benefits. 
Z /55 N.Y.2d a t 9 9 0 . 
§ /134 A.D.2d 127 (3d D e p ' t 1 9 8 8 ) . 
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To the extent Kelleher is a correct interpretation of 
Chalachan. it merely recognizes that there can be a viable breach 
of contract claim even if the contract claim does not rest upon 
the express terms of that contract. The jurisdictional inquiry 
required of us by §205.5(d) is differently focused. We examine 
whether the terms of the contract as negotiated by the parties to 
the improper practice charge actually afford a charging party at 
least a reasonably arguable source of right with respect to the 
subject of its charge. 
In this case, as in Chalachan. where the contractual cause 
of action was dismissed, the parties' contract is silent 
regarding the disabled police officers' eligibility for fringe 
benefits. Moreover, and more importantly in light of Kelleher. 
the parties in this case have stipulated that they did not intend 
their contract to be the source of any rights to the disabled 
police officers to the receipt of such benefits. That 
stipulation is entirely consistent with Chalachan, was made by 
experienced practitioners in good faith, and without evidence of 
any intent to manipulate the jurisdictional limitations in 
§205.5(d) of the Act.-7 Given the Court of Appeals' decision in 
Chalachan. and as the parties have stipulated that fringe 
-
7We are not bound by and would not give effect to parties' 
stipulations which are obviously inconsistent with any reasonable 
reading of their contract. The jurisdictional limitations in 
§205.5(d) of the Act are the Legislature's substantive 
limitations on our power to entertain improper practice charges 
which raise only contract violations and they must be given 
effect and made immune to parties' attempts to effect a finding 
of jurisdiction where it does not exist. 
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benefits were not extended to disabled police officers pursuant 
to the Village's contractual obligation, but only pursuant to a 
practice developed over time, we cannot hold that the contract in 
this case is a reasonably arguable source of a right to the 
continued receipt of those fringe benefits. The charge is, 
therefore, within our jurisdiction to consider. 
The Village's remaining exceptions center on the ALJ's 
rejection of its waiver defense. The parties' grievance 
procedure is set forth in Article XIII of their contract. In the 
opening paragraph of that article appears a sentence stating that 
"all past practices may be continued at the Village's 
discretion." The A U held that this language meant only that the 
Village could discontinue those past practices relating to the 
filing and disposition of grievances, not all past practices 
generally. 
The Village argues in its exceptions that the ALT 
erroneously used principles of statutory construction to reach an 
interpretation of the parties' agreement which is both contrary 
to their intent and unreasonable. The parties, however, have not 
offered any evidence of negotiating history or the application of 
this sentence to aid us in determining their intent. The Village 
stresses the words in the sentence in support of its waiver claim 
while the Association emphasizes the context in which those words 
are used. Both language and context are clearly relevant in 
ascertaining the parties' intent regarding a contractual waiver 
of bargaining rights. 
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Preliminarily, we note that the ALJ did not err in relying 
upon principles of statutory construction in reaching his 
conclusion for many, if not all, of those principles are equally 
applicable in ascertaining the intent of parties in making a 
contract. However, we conclude that the language relied upon by 
the Village is not ambiguous and clearly evidences a grant of 
right to the Village to discontinue noncontractual past practices 
in its discretion. 
A waiver of bargaining rights, whether by agreement or 
otherwise, must be clear, unmistakable and without ambiguity.-^ 
The language itself is clear, broad and of a type we have 
previously held effects a waiver of bargaining rights.—7 The 
Village's right to "continue" past practices in its discretion 
necessarily carries with it the right to discontinue those 
practices. But for its placement in the grievance procedure, 
there would be little question as to the Village's contractual 
right to discontinue past practices. We do not consider, 
however, that the placement of this language in the parties7 
grievance procedure creates an ambiguity out of language that is 
otherwise clear. In the face of such clear language, and in the 
absence of any evidence establishing that the placement was 
^CSEA. Inc. v. Newman, 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB J[7011 (3d Dep't), 
appeal dismissed. 57 N.Y.2d 775, 15 PERB f7020 (1982). 
•^Town of Greece, 26 PERB 5[3032 (1993) ; Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist. , 
21 PERB f3021 (1988). 
Board - U-16443 
-8 
intended to narrow the plain meaning of the words, the words used 
are properly afforded primary consideration. 
The ALJ believed that the clause would have been placed in 
the existing management rights clause.if the language were 
mutually intended to have the meaning ascribed to it by the 
Village. Although placement of this clause in a management 
rights clause would certainly have been logical, placement in the 
grievance procedure is not illogical. 
This particular grievance procedure allows a grievance to be 
filed with respect to any complaint by an employee or a group of 
employees "aggrieved as a result of any matter, condition, right 
or privilege arising out of the course of the employer-employee 
relationship". Grievances, therefore, may clearly be filed about 
changes in past practices. As a grievance procedure is a union's 
primary means of addressing complaints arising within the 
employer-employee relationship, placing a clause within that 
procedure which gives an employer the right to change past 
practices in its discretion cannot, in our opinion, be considered 
an illogical placement. 
Our conclusion is supported by the fact that this grievance 
procedure does not end in binding arbitration as to any grievance 
and the fact that "noncontractual grievances" end with a 
determination by the Village Manager under §4 of the grievance 
procedure. "Noncontractual grievances" is a phrase reasonably 
interpreted to include grievances relating to the "past 
practices" referenced in the introductory paragraph of the 
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grievance procedure. Indeed, lacking any other evidence, that is 
the most reasonable interpretation of the phrase. Leaving the 
final disposition of past practice grievances to the Village 
Manager is entirely consistent with, and indeed supportive of, 
our conclusion that the language in the first paragraph of the 
grievance procedure vests the Village with the right to continue 
or discontinue past practices in its discretion. 
The Association argues, however, that there can be no waiver 
because the record does not reveal whether the language was 
actually negotiated or derived from an interest arbitration 
proceeding. Although there is no record evidence as to the 
source of the contract language, the Association's argument is 
not persuasive. The parties having placed the language in their 
collective bargaining agreement, that language is consensual as a 
matter of law, even if incorporated therein in furtherance of an 
interest arbitration award. 
For the reasons set forth above, the AKT#s jurisdictional 
determination is affirmed. The decision and order finding the 
Village in violation of the Act is reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 9, 1997 
Albany, New York \ 
PaiiliiraR. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Marc-A.'Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16883 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
TAXATION AND FINANCE), 
Respondent. 
WILLIAM P. SEAMON, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL (JEFFREY G. PLANT 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL Of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of 
New York (Department of Taxation and Finance) (State or 
Department) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (AKT) 
finding that the State violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
discontinued, due to the lack of a State budget, its practice of 
providing travel advances to tax auditors in the unit represented 
by the Public Employees Federation (PEF). 
The ALJ held that the Department has a practice of 
advancing, upon request, money to cover expenses for lodging, 
meals and car rentals to tax auditors traveling on official State 
Board - U-16883 
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business. The ALJ found that the practice had been adhered to in 
prior years even when no State budget had been adopted.-^ 
On May 12, 1995, the Department issued a memorandum to PEF 
employees whose duties involve travel that the Department had 
exhausted its travel monies and that it would not be able to pay 
travel advances for the week beginning May 22 because the State 
did not have a budget. Employees were instructed to continue to 
travel and were advised that they could obtain a corporate 
American Express card to help alleviate the situation. On June 
12, 1995, the travel advance practice was restored, after a new 
State budget was adopted on June 1 or 2, 1995. The affected 
employees were then reimbursed for the travel expenses they 
incurred between May 22 and June 11, 1995. 
In its exceptions, the State argues that the ALJ erred by 
finding that PERB has jurisdiction to hear this charge, that 
there was a change in practice, that PEF had not waived its right 
to negotiate and that the charge was timely filed. PEF supports 
the AU's decision. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we conclude that the charge should be deferred and 
conditionally dismissed because it raises arguable breach of 
-'Apparently on one occasion in the 1970's and on one in the 
1980's, funds for travel were depleted due to the lack of a State 
budget. On those two occasions, employees were given local 
assignments which did not necessitate travel until a State budget 
was adopted. Given the basis of our decision, we make no finding 
as to the nature of the State's travel policy or practice whether 
under the contract or apart from it. 
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contract allegations which are better resolved, if possible, in 
the grievance arbitration process. 
The State argues that its 1991-1995 collective bargaining 
agreement with PEF covers travel expenses and, therefore, divests 
PERB of jurisdiction to hear the charge. However, the contract 
expired on March 31, 1995, before the denial of travel advances 
in May 1995. Since no contract was in effect at the time^7 of 
the unilateral change, we have jurisdiction over this charge. 
However, we decline to exercise our jurisdiction in this 
matter. The State, in its answer, sought deferral of the merits 
of the charge to the binding arbitration provisions of the 
parties' collective bargaining agreement if the charge were 
determined to be within our jurisdiction. The ALJ did not reach 
the deferral issue, but we are not precluded from doing so on our 
own motion. While we have jurisdiction over the charge, we also 
have a long-standing policy of deferring a determination on the 
merits of a refusal to bargain charge resting on a unilateral 
change to parties' negotiated grievance arbitration procedures. 
As we held recently in Town of Carmel.^7 
When, as here, the disposition of a refusal to bargain 
charge necessitates an interpretation of an agreement 
which is arguably a source of right to the charging 
party, and an award rendered under a binding grievance 
arbitration procedure is potentially dispositive of the 
issues underlying the charge, we have been persuaded 
that the policies of the Act favoring an accommodation 
of the parties' dispute resolution procedures are again 
^The parties entered into a contract for the term 1995-1999 
on or about October 2, 1995. 
^29 PERB ^3073, at 3175 (1996), 
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advanced by a conditional dismissal of the charge, even 
when the charging party union has elected not to invoke 
the grievance arbitration provisions of its contract, 
(footnote omitted) 
Here, the parties' contract contains a travel reimbursement 
provision. It also incorporates the Rules and Regulations of the 
Comptroller,-7 which gives agencies the power to pay travel 
advances to employees who are required to travel on official 
business. The provisions of the contract are reasonably 
susceptible to a conclusion that the denial of travel advances 
under circumstances in which employees are ordered to continue to 
travel violates the parties' agreement. As the disposition of a 
grievance filed pursuant to this section could resolve the issues 
raised in this charge, the matter is appropriately deferred to 
the parties' grievance arbitration procedure subject to a motion 
to reopen pursuant to the criteria set forth in New York City 
Transit Authority (Bordansky).5/ 
For the reasons set forth above, the charge is conditionally 
dismissed subject to a motion to reopen in accordance with our 
decision herein. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: 
Albany, New York /C^ i ^  x^ \~ J 
PaulineiR. Kinsella, Ch "a i rperson 
Jjfarc/A. Abbot t , Member 
^2 NYCRR Part 8, §8.15, 
^4 PERB f3031 (1971). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, APSCME, AFL-CIO, 
WARREN COUNTY LOCAL 857, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-17848 
WARRENSBURG CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
-and-
WARRENSBUR6 TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ Of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
RUBERTI, GIRVIN & FERLAZZO, P.C. (JEFFREY D. HONEYWELL 
of counsel), for Respondent 
JAMES R. SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (KEVIN H. HARREN of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Warren County Local 857 (CSEA) to a decision by an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ). CSEA alleges in its charge against the 
Warrensburg Central School District (District) that the District 
violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it assigned to employees in a unit represented by the 
Warrensburg Teachers' Association (Association) the duties of 
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chaperoning high school concerts and plays in the 1995-96 school 
year. Pursuant to a 1996 memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
between the District and the Association, which gives employees 
in the Association's unit the right of first refusal in 
chaperoning all school events, a teacher served as a chaperon at 
a high school concert on May 3, 1996. 
After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge, holding that 
CSEA did not have exclusivity over chaperoning high school 
concerts and plays. The ALJ found in this respect that District 
administrators regularly served in a chaperoning capacity at 
these events. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the District's 
administrators did not serve as chaperons at such events. 
Rather, it claims that they were present at high school concerts 
or plays in a supervisory capacity and any chaperoning done in 
that capacity does not breach its exclusivity over chaperoning 
duties. 
Both the District and the Association urge affirmance of the 
ALJ's decision. 
Having reviewed that record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
An employer violates its duty to negotiate in relevant 
respect only by the unilateral transfer of unit work over which 
the charging party has established and maintained exclusivity.-' 
Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth. , 18 PERB [^3013 (1985) . 
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CSEA admittedly has no exclusivity over chaperoning in general. 
The 1995-99 collective bargaining agreement between the 
Association and the District, and prior contracts between those 
parties dating back to 1982, have specifically covered 
chaperoning duties and rights. CSEA's contracts with the 
District, dating back to at least 1985, are silent with respect 
to chaperoning duties. Nor does CSEA have exclusivity over 
chaperoning at concerts. Teachers have regularly chaperoned 
elementary school concerts. Therefore, CSEA argues that its 
exclusivity is correctly assessed in the context of high school 
concerts. However, the location of a concert, being unrelated to 
chaperoning duties, cannot form any discernible boundary within 
which to test exclusivity.-7 As CSEA admittedly has no 
exclusivity over chaperoning outside the boundary it proposes, 
and having rejected that proposed boundary, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed and CSEA's exceptions are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: October 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
fcyS^Z-LiKUjl 
Paul ine \R . Ki r i se l l a , Chai rperson 
Marc A'. A b b o ^ , Member 
^County of Erie, 28 PERB ^3053 (1995) ; Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. 
Dist., 26 PERB f3075 (1973); City of Buffalo, 24 PERB 13043 
(1991). 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Lockport (City) to a decision by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director). After a 
hearing, the Director determined that the unit of the City's 
department heads petitioned for by the City of Lockport 
Department Heads (petitioner) was most appropriate.^ The City 
opposes the petition solely on the ground that all of its eleven 
^The Director determined that the City Clerk is managerial based 
upon the Clerk's role in collective negotiations on behalf of the 
City. No exceptions have been taken to the Director's decision 
in this regard. 
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department heads are managerial within the meaning of §201.7(a) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act).2/ 
The unit found appropriate by the Director included the 
following: 
Police Chief, Fire Chief, Youth and Recreation 
Director, Building Maintenance Superintendent, Highway 
and Parks Superintendent, Community Development 
Director, Director of Utilities, Chief Building 
Inspector, Assessor, and Director of Engineering. 
None of the persons in this unit were held to be managerial 
either as policy makers or as labor relations or personnel 
assistants or collective bargaining agreement administrators. 
The City excepts to the Director's determination that the 
employees do not formulate policy within the meaning of 
§207.1(a)(i) of the Act.57 In that regard, the Director 
determined that the department heads are supervisory personnel 
-'Section 201.7(a) defines the term "public employee" as "any 
person holding a position by appointment or employment in the 
service of a public employer, except that such term shall not 
include for the purposes of any provision of this article other 
than sections two hundred ten and two hundred eleven of this 
article,...persons...who may reasonably be designated 
from time to time as managerial or confidential upon application 
of the public employer to the appropriate board.... Employees 
may be designated as managerial only if they are persons (i) who 
formulate policy or (ii) who may reasonably be required on behalf 
of the public employer to assist directly in the preparation for 
and conduct of collective negotiations or to have a major role in 
the administration of agreements or in personnel administration 
provided that such role is not of a routine or clerical nature 
and requires the exercise of independent judgment. Employees may 
be designated as confidential only if they are persons who assist 
and act in a confidential capacity to managerial employees 
described in clause (ii)." 
^No exceptions are taken to the Director's determination that 
the employees are not managerial under §207.1 (a)(ii) of the Act. 
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who are responsible for day-to-day operational determinations. 
None, according to the Director, however, has a major role in 
determining the City's policies, goals or objectives at a level 
necessary for managerial designation under §207.1(a)(i) as policy 
formulators. According to the Director, these employees only 
implement policies formulated by the City's Mayor, common council 
and various commissions, legislative committees or boards, which, 
acting either singly or, more often, in combination, exercise 
close and exclusive control over all policy determinations 
affecting the City. 
The City argues that the Director's decision rests on errors 
of fact. According to the City, not all department heads report 
to committees, commissions or boards, and many of the latter do 
not have any oversight, review or approval power over department 
heads. The City also argues that the department heads are 
responsible for more than just the day-to-day running of their 
departments. Rather, according to the City, each of the 
department heads in issue has initiated and developed programs of 
a type and level sufficient to warrant their exclusion from 
representation as managerial policy makers. 
The petitioner argues in response that the record offers 
compelling evidence in support of the Director's decision that 
these department heads implement policies established by their 
executive and legislative superiors. It argues that the record 
in its entirety shows persuasively that the department heads do 
not have a major role in setting high level goals and objectives 
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for the City and, therefore, they cannot be deprived of their 
statutory right to organize. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the decision 
of the Director. 
In City of Binghamton,-1 we held: 
To formulate policy is to participate with regularity 
in the essential process involving the determination of 
the goals and objectives of the government involved, 
and of the methods for accomplishing those goals and 
objectives that have a substantial impact upon the 
affairs and the constituency of the government. The 
formulation of policy does not extend to the 
determination of methods of operation that are merely 
of a technical nature. 
The Director held that none of the in-issue employees formulate 
policy. Rather, they are high-level supervisors who are 
responsible for the day-to-day operation of their departments and 
who offer advice of a technical nature to the real decision-
makers: the Mayor, the common council and its various sub-
committees as well as commissions appointed by the Mayor, boards 
established by City charter and citizen advisory groups.-7 The 
department heads are nonvoting members of the bodies which have 
*'12 PERB f3099, at 3185 (1979). 
^The record establishes that there are approximately 17 such 
bodies, including the sewer and water committee, personnel 
committee, finance committee, public health and safety committee, 
highway and parks committee, traffic control and service 
committee, youth and recreation committee, events and 
celebrations committee, Mayor's substance abuse committee, 
planning and zoning board, zoning board of appeals, police board, 
fire board, board of assessment and review, board of estimate and 
apportionment, and civil service commission. 
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oversight of their departments. They may make recommendations to 
these bodies and those recommendations may be favorably passed on 
to the Mayor and the common council for final approval; but 
beyond basic supervisory decisions and minor expenditures, the 
department heads have no authority to formulate policy.-7 While 
they offer technical advice and make some proposals directly to 
the Mayor or common council, in most circumstances they are far 
removed from the final decision and do not "directly assist the 
ultimate decisionmakers in reaching the decisions necessary to 
the conduct of the business of government."^ 
The City argues that the Director erred in finding that all 
department heads report to a committee, commission or board. 
While some of the department heads may not report to a specific 
body regularly, all must obtain permission to act, either from a 
committee, commission or board, or from the common council or 
Mayor. They likewise receive instructions for implementation of 
programs decided upon by the Mayor or the common council or one 
of its sub-committees. The department heads may make day-to-day 
-'For example, the Highway and Parks Superintendent made a budget 
request for salt for icy roads and shovels for the workers. A 
certain sum of money, less than his request, was granted by the 
common council and the Superintendent was directed to purchase 
the material and equipment from a specific vendor, and only in 
the amounts as budgeted. The Superintendent further testified 
that he developed a list of streets that would require repaving 
in the coming year and he submitted a budgetary request to cover 
the materials and labor. He received approximately one-quarter 
of the money he requested and was given specific directions by 
the Mayor as to what streets would be repaved and in what order, 
and he was not allowed, to deviate from the list. 
City of Lackawanna, 28 PERB 53043, at 3100 (1995). 
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technical decisions about the operation of their departments, for 
example, granting time off, determining the order in which work 
will be performed or setting initial rates, fees or assessments. 
Any decisions of City-wide importance are made by the Mayor or 
his appointees or the common council. Department heads do not 
hire new employees, they do not discipline, fire or promote 
current employees, and they may only expend sums of money under 
$500. Some are the first step of the grievance procedure, but 
none are involved in any ultimate determination of a 
grievance. 
The City has chosen to have the Mayor and/or the common 
council take direct day-to-day responsibility for the operation 
of its departments and employees. Having done so, the City can 
not argue that the at-issue employees are policy makers of a 
level which warrants the denial of their representation 
rights.-7 Neither does the fact, as argued by the City, that 
some department heads sit on various commissions or boards as 
representatives of the City or in their capacity as a department 
head warrant a contrary conclusion. While an employee's 
representation of the public employer in meetings with other 
governments or with other constituents is one indication of 
managerial status, it will not by itself support a managerial 
designation, especially when the role of the employee is as 
See Watervliet Housing Auth.. 18 PERB f3079 (1985). 
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limited as it is here and the employee exercises no other 
managerial prerogatives. 
Based on the foregoing, the City's exceptions are denied. 
The Director included the fire chief and the police chief in 
the at-issue unit. We have long had a practice of establishing 
separate units of police officers and fire fighters. "Apart from 
historical reasons, this practice derives from a recognition that 
policemen and firefighters are not only fundamentally different 
from everyone else but also that they are different from each 
other in ways that affect the essence of their labor 
relations."27 In addition, the police chief, as a member of an 
eligible police department, and the fire chief, as a member of a 
fire department, are entitled to compulsory interest arbitration 
in the resolution of an impasse in collective negotiations, 
pursuant to §209.4 of our Rules of Procedure. The other 
employees in the unit found appropriate by the Director are not 
eligible for such dispute resolution procedures. We have 
previously decided that "the difference in applicable impasse 
resolution procedures is a significant and important reason for 
defining a separate unit for police officers"^7 and fire 
fighters. We find, therefore, that the police chief and fire 
^Citv of Amsterdam. 10 PERB 53031, at 3061 (1977). 
^Village of Skaneateles. 16 PERB J[3070, at 3113 (1983). 
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chief are not appropriately placed in the unit sought by the 
petitioner, and the petition is dismissed as to them.—' 
The unit placement of the other titles, once their 
managerial status was determined, has not been disputed, and 
there is no other impediment to the representation case 
proceeding as outlined below. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that there be a unit established 
for employees of the City of Lockport in the following titles: 
Included: Youth and Recreation Director, Building 
Maintenance Superintendent, 
Highways and Parks Superintendent, 
Community Development Director, 
Director of Utilities, Chief 
Building Inspector, Assessor, 
Director of Engineering. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the City shall submit to the 
Director and to the petitioner, within fifteen working days from 
the date of receipt of this decision, an alphabetized list of all 
employees within the unit determined to be appropriate who were 
employed on the payroll date immediately preceding the date of 
this decision. 
—'Based upon our dismissal of the petition as to the police chief 
and the fire chief, we need not decide the motion to intervene in 
these proceedings filed by the Lockport Professional Firefighters 
Association, Local 963. Our dismissal of the instant petition 
with respect to these two positions is without prejudice to the 
filing of a petition to include these titles in the existing 
police and fire fighter units. Also, as no organization has 
sought to represent a unit consisting only of the police chief 
and fire chief, the appropriateness of such a unit need not be 
addressed. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an election by secret ballot 
shall be held under the Director's supervision among the 
employees in said unit unless the petitioner submits to the 
Director, within fifteen working days from the date of receipt of 
this decision, evidence to satisfy the requirements of 
§201.9(g)(i) of the Board's Rules of Procedure for certification 
without an election. 
DATED: October 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kihsella, Chairperson 
Marcf A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4627 
MANCHESTER-SHORTSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
-and-
RED JACKET FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ of counsel), 
for Petitioner 
BRENT D. COOLEY, for Employer 
MARILYN N. NORDINE, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Manchester-
Shortsville Central School District (District) to a decision by 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) placing teacher assistants in a unit represented by 
the Red Jacket Faculty Association (Association) and creating a 
unit of noninstructional employees, sought to be represented by 
the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). 
On December 19, 1996, CSEA filed a petition seeking to 
represent the following unit of unrepresented employees of the 
District: 
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Included: Teacher assistant, secretary, 
typist, account clerk, nurse 
(LPN/RN), teacher aide, cleaner, 
groundskeeper, custodian, senior 
custodian, supervisor, bus driver, 
transportation manager, food 
service manager and food service 
worker. 
Excluded: Superintendent's secretary, 
business manager's secretary/ 
District treasurer. 
The District opposed the proposed unit on several grounds, 
one of which was that the Association, during negotiations, had 
proposed the inclusion of the teacher assistants in its unit. 
The Association-7 represents the following unit: 
Included: Teacher, school nurse, guidance 
counselor, psychologist and regular 
substitutes who are appointed for 
one semester or more. 
Excluded: Per diem substitutes, BOCES 
personnel, superintendent, 
assistant superintendent, building 
principals, and other 
administrative staff members. 
Thereafter, CSEA amended its petition to seek the following 
unit which excluded teacher assistants: 
Included: Account clerk/typist, typist, 
senior typist, school monitor, 
teacher aide, food service helper, 
cleaner, cleaner part-time, 
groundskeeper, building maintenance 
mechanic, school bus driver, head 
-
7The Association moved to intervene in the proceeding, claiming 
that it already represented the title of nurse and because it was 
seeking to represent the teacher assistants. The Administrative 
Law Judge granted the Association's motion in a February 18, 1997 
letter, which also confirmed that CSEA was withdrawing its 
petition with respect to the title of nurse. See State of 
New York fDMNA). 19 PERB f3008, aff'q 19 PERB 54019 (1986). 
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bus driver-mechanic, and cook 
manager. 
Excluded: Superintendent's secretary, 
business manager's secretary and 
secretary to the director of 
instructional services and 
commission on special education. 
The District then argued, as to the unit proposed by CSEA, 
that the head bus driver and the cook managers-7 should be 
excluded as supervisory personnel and, notwithstanding its 
earlier position, that teacher assistants were appropriately 
included in the unit proposed by CSEA. CSEA thereafter consented 
to the exclusion of the head bus driver and the cook managers. A 
hearing was then held with only the District and the Association 
participating because the only issue remaining was the placement 
of the teacher assistants. 
In his decision, the Director determined that the teacher 
assistants were most appropriately placed in the Association's 
unit because of their shared community of interest with the 
teachers. He also determined that the CSEA's petitioned-for 
unit, as amended, was the most appropriate unit. He ordered an 
election in the CSEA unit, unless CSEA submitted evidence to 
satisfy the requirements of §201.9(g)(1) of our Rules of 
Procedure for certification without election. 
The District excepts to the Director's decision, arguing 
that the teacher assistants are not appropriately added to the 
unit of teachers, nurses and other allied professionals, but 
^The cook manager had been identified in the original petition 
as food service manager. 
Board - C-4627 -4 
should be included in CSEA's noninstructional unit. Neither CSEA 
nor the Association has responded to the District's exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
We have determined previously that the most appropriate 
placement of teacher assistants as allied professional employees 
is in a unit of teachers and other instructional personnel 
because of their professional requirements, mission and 
interaction with students.-7 Teacher assistants are authorized 
to serve in an instructional capacity under the general 
supervision of a licensed or certified teacher. Teacher 
assistants receive a temporary license upon graduation from high 
school with appropriate training and, after two years, a 
continuing certificate premised upon the completion of six 
semester hours of collegiate study in the area of elementary 
and/or secondary school service and one year's experience.^7 
At the time of the hearing-7, one of the two teacher 
assistants held a masters degree in special education and 
instructed students in math, reading and spelling, taught classes 
for individual teachers on a relief basis, and assisted students 
-
7See Eastchester Union Free Sch. Dist., 28 PERB f3064 (1995); 
Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist.r 28 PERB f3029 (1995), rev'd on 
other grounds, 168 Misc. 2d 284, 29 PERB ?[7004 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Co. 
1996), rev'd, 233 A.D.2d 602, 29 PERB 17020 (3d Dep't 1996); 
Dutchess County BOCES, 25 PERB ^3048 (1992); Onondacra-Cortland-
Madison BOCES, 23 PERB 3014 (1991). 
-
7See Regulations of the Commissioner of Education, 8 NYCRR 
§80.33. 
-
7Since the hearing, the teacher assistant with the Master's 
degree has resigned. 
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in the use of instructional materials. The other certified 
teacher assistant is assigned to the special education classroom 
and is primarily responsible for the instruction and testing of a 
severely handicapped student,-7 but she also teaches Spanish and 
reading classes during the first three periods of the day. 
A teacher assistant's ten-month salary is approximately 
$12,700 per year, while the average teacher's salary is 
approximately $44,000 per year. The noninstructional employees 
are paid on an hourly basis. The teacher assistants currently 
receive the same benefit package as the support staff pursuant to 
the "Support Staff Handbook" for 1995-1997, a document arrived at 
through discussions between representatives of the support staff 
and the District. 
The District points to the disparity in benefits between the 
teachers and the teacher assistants and the length of time it 
took to conclude negotiations with the teachers' unit once the 
nurses were included, and argues that the teacher assistants are 
not allied professionals. These arguments were made to the 
Director and, consistent with our earlier decisions, the Director 
determined that the teacher assistants share a professional 
community of interest with the teachers based upon their shared 
mission, their interaction with students and similar terms and 
conditions of employment (such as length of workday and 
-'Two teacher aides in CSEA's unit are responsible for meeting 
this and other students' physical needs. 
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workyear), even though they have different occupational 
functions, salary schedules and retirement plans. 
Having been provided with no factual or legal basis to 
distinguish this case on any relevant grounds from our prior 
decisions, the teacher assistants are, as found by the Director, 
most appropriately placed in the Association's unit. 
As the teacher assistants are appropriately placed in the 
Association's unit, there are no other arguments before us as to 
the appropriateness of the unit sought to be represented by 
CSEA.Z/ 
We, therefore, deny the District's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the Director. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the position of teacher 
assistant is added to the unit represented by the Association. 
As the inclusion of the teacher assistant in that unit does not 
bring into question the Association's continuing majority status, 
no election is necessary,-' and the position is added to the 
unit as of the date of this decision. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that there shall be a unit of 
employees of the District as follows: 
Included: Account clerk/typist, typist, senior 
typist, school monitor, teacher aide, 
^In its exceptions, the District questions, without offering any 
basis, the showing of interest submitted by CSEA. The 
sufficiency of the showing of interest is a purely ministerial 
determination by the Director and is not subject to review. 
Rules of Procedure, §201.4(c). 
^New York Convention Center Operating Corp., 27 PERB f3034 
(1994) . 
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food service helper, cleaner, cleaner 
part-time, groundskeeper, building 
maintenance mechanic, and school bus 
driver. 
Excluded: Superintendent's secretary, 
business manager's secretary and 
secretary to the director of 
instructional services and 
commission on special education, 
head bus driver-mechanic and cook 
manager. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an election by secret ballot 
shall be held under the direction of the Director among the 
employees in the unit determined herein to be appropriate and who 
were employed on the payroll date immediately preceding the date 
of this decision and order, unless CSEA submits to the Director 
within fifteen (15) working days from the date of the receipt of 
this decision and order, evidence to satisfy the requirements of 
§201.9(g)(1) of the Rules of Procedure for certification without 
an election. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the District shall submit to the 
Director and CSEA within fifteen (15) working days from receipt 
of this decision and order, an alphabetized list of all employees 
within the unit determined herein to be appropriate who were 
employed on the payroll date immediately preceding the date of 
this decision and order. 
DATED: October 9, 1997 
Albany, New York ^ ^ y 
Pauline R. Kihsella,Chairperson 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (AKT) 
finding, pursuant to a charge filed by Teamsters Local 264 
(Teamsters) that the County of Erie and the Sheriff of Erie 
County (County) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it had corrections officers 
represented by CSEA guard certain prisoners who had been 
transferred from the County Holding Center to the County 
Correctional Facility. The Teamsters' charge alleges that the 
County's action violated the Act because the deputy sheriffs, who 
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are represented by the Teamsters, had exclusivity over the 
guarding of these prisoners, regardless of the location of their 
incarceration. CSEA represents corrections officers at the 
County Correctional Facility and it asserts that the supervision 
of any prisoners at that facility, regardless of their status, is 
exclusively the work of its unit members. 
The ALJ determined that the supervision of pretrial and 
presentence detainees and parole violators, whether housed at the 
Holding Center, the Correctional Facility or any other location, 
had been and remained the exclusive bargaining unit work of the 
deputy sheriffs in the Teamsters' unit. The ALJ further found 
that CSEA unit employees had temporarily guarded these prisoners 
when housed at the Correctional Facility pursuant to agreements 
between the Teamsters and the County and that the Teamsters had 
timely filed the charge when it became apparent that the 
assignments were no longer temporary but permanent. 
Additionally, the ALJ found that the County had violated the Act 
when it refused to negotiate the Teamsters' demand that it cease 
the assignment of corrections officers to guard pretrial and 
presentence detainees and parole violators. 
CSEA asserts in its exceptions that its unit members have 
been guarding pretrial and presentence detainees and parole 
violators at the Correctional Facility for several years, that 
the Teamsters knew about these assignments, and that the charge 
is, therefore, untimely. CSEA further argues that the Teamsters 
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did not maintain exclusivity over the work by virtue of the 
Teamsters' agreements with the County. 
The County, having withdrawn its answer and its affirmative 
defenses before the hearing, concurs with the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of 
the parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the AKT but 
modify the remedial order. 
The County operates the Holding Center, a maximum security 
facility, which is staffed by deputy sheriffs. Pretrial and 
presentence detainees and parole violators, who may be in custody 
for anything from passing bad checks to murder, are housed at the 
Holding Center. Due to chronic overcrowding at that facility, 
the Sheriff has for many years housed the overflow at the 
Correctional Facility, with the exception of an eighteen-month 
period in 1986-1987, when renovations at the Holding Center 
provided sufficient space. 
The County also operates a Correctional Facility, a minimum 
security facility housing sentenced misdemeanants, who are 
guarded by corrections officers in CSEA's unit. Until 1986, 
overflow from the Holding Center was housed in an annex at the 
Wende Correctional Facility, under the supervision of deputy 
sheriffs. That facility was sold to the State and, during 1985-
1986, inmates were relocated to the County's new Alden 
Correctional Facility. Deputy sheriffs continued to guard any 
inmates who were sent to the Correctional Facility from the 
Holding Center due to overcrowding. 
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By the spring of 1986, the County had completed an addition 
to the Holding Center. As a result, all prisoners remanded to 
the Sheriff were housed at the Holding Center. However, by 1987, 
there were once again too many prisoners in the Sheriff's custody 
to be housed at the Holding Center. By court order or substitute 
jail order, the excess prisoners were transferred to Alden, the 
City of Buffalo Police lock-up, and, for a short time in 1992, to 
the Connecticut Street Armory. These prisoners continued to be 
guarded by deputy sheriffs, except that in July 1987, the Sheriff 
began transferring male parole violators to the Alden 
Correctional Facility and placing them under the supervision of 
the corrections officers. Sometime thereafter, between 1989 and 
1991, presentence detainees also were assigned to Alden, to be 
guarded by corrections officers. 
Representatives of the Teamsters met with John Dray, 
Superintendent of the Holding Center, as early as 1987, to 
express their concern that work that had been exclusively 
performed by deputy sheriffs was now being done by corrections 
officers. Dray assured first Edward Button, and later Thomas 
Dziedzic, the Teamsters' representatives, that the County 
continued to recognize that the duties were Teamsters' bargaining 
unit work. He told them that the transfers were only temporary 
and were being made under court or Department of Corrections 
orders to alleviate overcrowding at the Holding Center. 
The Teamsters were told in 1989, by Dray and Lou Giardina, 
Assistant Chief of Administration, that the County had a plan to 
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add additional beds to the Holding Center, which would alleviate 
the overcrowding. Based on the County's assurances, the 
Teamsters agreed to work with the County toward a permanent 
solution to the overcrowding problem. 
In 1991, Dziedzic became aware of the transfers which had 
begun of presentenced male prisoners to Alden under the 
supervision of corrections officers.-^ Dray once again 
reassured Dziedzic that the proposed expansion at the Holding 
Center would adequately meet the space requirements for all of 
the prisoners remanded to the Sheriff's custody. However, by 
1993 the construction project at the Holding Center was complete, 
but there was still insufficient space to house all the 
prisoners, who continued to be transferred, as necessary, to 
Alden. Believing the transfer of prisoners to Alden now to be a 
permanent situation, in November 1993, Dziedzic demanded that the 
County immediately cease subcontracting Teamsters bargaining unit 
work and negotiate in good faith. The County failed to respond 
to his letter and this charge was filed. 
After a conference in this matter, the County and the 
Teamsters agreed to hold the charge in abeyance while they 
attempted to resolve the matter. In November 1994, they entered 
into an agreement to continue to hold the charge while they 
continued negotiating a resolution of the charge and the 
•^ At all times here relevant, deputy sheriffs supervised parole 
violators, pretrial and presentence detainees at other facilities 
and in transit between facilities, including Alden. 
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underlying situation. The County acknowledged in the agreement 
that the supervision of prisoners remanded to the Sheriff's 
custody was and is the exclusive bargaining unit work of the 
Teamsters and that the County would try to keep the number of 
prisoners transferred to Alden to an average daily minimum of 
fifteen or less. The County further agreed that if this matter 
went to hearing, it would withdraw its answer, including its 
affirmative defense of timeliness. 
CSEA intervened in this matter in March 1996. In April 
1996, the County advised the Teamsters that it would be opening a 
segregated unit at Alden which would house presentence detainees, 
including newly arrested parole violators, who would be guarded 
solely by deputy sheriffs. The hearing in this case was held in 
November 1996. Effective January 1, 1997, the County did 
establish such a separate unit, staffed with deputy sheriffs.-7 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the charge filed by the 
Teamsters in 1993 is untimely, as the guarding of prisoners 
housed in the County Correctional Facility has been exclusively 
the work of the corrections officers in its unit since September 
1989. CSEA further argues that the Teamsters had acquiesced in 
these assignments because its only reservation to the County was 
that the pretrial and presentence detainees and parole violators 
be assigned to the Holding Center, where the Teamsters had 
-'CSEA filed an improper practice charge, Case No. U-18607, on 
January 15, 1997, alleging that the County had violated the Act 
by assigning this work to the deputy sheriffs. That case is 
being held in abeyance pending our decision in this case. 
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exclusivity, not that deputy sheriffs be assigned to guard these 
prisoners at the Correctional Facility. 
Timeliness 
In 1989, the County, due to overcrowding and staffing 
problems, transferred some of the parole violators to the 
Correctional Facility under the supervision of the corrections 
officers. The Teamsters immediately protested to the County, and 
received assurances from the County that it did not consider the 
Teamsters' exclusivity to be breached and that the situation was 
temporary. The Teamsters, having relied on those assurances and 
in a spirit of harmonious and cooperative labor relations, agreed 
to work with the County to find a solution rather than pursuing 
an improper practice charge at that time. Thereafter, the 
Teamsters continually maintained the position that the guarding 
of prisoners remanded to the custody of the Sheriff, regardless 
of location, was exclusively the work of the deputy sheriffs, and 
the County agreed. It was only when it became apparent to the 
Teamsters that the temporary solutions to the overcrowding 
problem had been exhausted and that some of the prisoners the 
deputy sheriffs had historically guarded exclusively would have 
to be housed at Alden indefinitely that this charge was filed. 
We have previously held that any reassignment of unit work, 
regardless of its scope or duration, is actionable.-' The 
question raised by CSEA's exceptions is whether the Teamsters7 
See Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 18 PERB ^3083 (1985). 
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charge, filed several years after the first assignment of 
corrections officers to perform work previously performed 
exclusively by deputy sheriffs, is timely. It is timely filed if 
it was filed within four months of when the Teamsters first knew 
or should have known that the assignment of unit work was no 
longer temporary.-7 
Although the Teamsters knew of the temporary transfers of 
unit work to CSEA at least by 1991, and perhaps as early as 1989, 
those transfers were characterized by the County as temporary, 
with the County's assurances that it continued to recognize the 
work as remaining exclusively within the Teamsters' unit, and 
with the County's representations that steps were being taken to 
rectify the situation. It was not until November 1993, when all 
the planned renovations and expansions at the Holding Center were 
completed, that the Teamsters knew that the assignments were 
permanent because the County had no other proposals or options to 
deal with the overcrowding except to assign prisoners remanded to 
the Sheriff's custody to Alden, where they were supervised by the 
corrections officers. The Teamsters then demanded that the 
County cease and desist from unilaterally assigning unit work to 
nonunit personnel and demanded that the County negotiate in good 
faith. The charge, filed within four months of the Teamsters' 
^Great Neck Water Pollution Control Dist., 27 PERB 53057 (1994) 
(subsequent history omitted); County of Onondaga, 12 PERB f3035 
(1979), conf'd, 77 A.D.2d 783, 13 PERB 17011 (4th Dep't 1980). 
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learning of the change of the assignment from temporary to 
permanent, is, therefore, timely. 
The purposes of the Act are not effectuated by a decision 
requiring a bargaining agent to file an improper practice charge 
in circumstances, such as these, where the public employer 
implements a temporary solution to an ongoing problem, but seeks 
the bargaining agent's cooperation in resolving the problem, 
while recognizing that agent's rights under the Act. Indeed, we 
have held that an employee organization's belief that a change is 
temporary is sufficient to make a charge timely if that belief is 
"reasonably attributable to statements and/or actions by the 
[employer]."-7 Here, the record clearly evidences that both the 
Teamsters and the County believed that the assignment of the 
corrections officers to guard presentence detainees and parole 
violators who had been transferred to Alden was temporary and 
that the County made those assurances to the Teamsters. 
Exclusivity 
CSEA's other exceptions relate solely to exclusivity. It 
claims exclusivity over the work in issue by virtue of its 
performance of the work during the period 1989 through 1993. 
CSEA further argues that the Teamsters only sought the return of 
unit work to the Holding Center, not to supervise prisoners 
remanded to the custody of the Sheriff while housed at Alden. 
s/peer Park Union Free Sch. Dist., 27 PERB H3064, at 3148 (1994). 
See also Great Neck and Onondaga, supra. 
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In County of Onondaga,^ on facts almost identical to this 
case, we determined that the deputy sheriffs had exclusivity over 
the guarding of all prisoners remanded to the custody of the 
County Sheriff, regardless of the location in which those 
prisoners were housed. Here, the record amply supports the ALJ's 
finding that prior to 1987, the deputy sheriffs guarded all 
pretrial and presentence detainees and all parole violators, 
whether at the Holding Center, the County Correctional Facility 
or any other location. 
As to CSEA's claim of exclusivity, the Teamsters has 
retained exclusivity over the guarding of pretrial and 
presentence detainees and parole violators at all times by reason 
of the County's continuous recognition of the Teamsters' claim to 
the work. CSEA has never had exclusivity over this work. That 
CSEA may not have known about the agreements between the 
Teamsters and the County which permitted the assignment of the 
guarding of these prisoners to the corrections officers does not 
serve to divest the Teamsters of exclusivity over its unit 
work.-/ 
s/24 PERB f3014 (1991), conf'd, 187 A.D.2d 1014, 25 PERB fl7015 
(4th Dep't 1992), motion for leave to appeal denied, 81 N.Y.2d 
706, 26 PERB f7003 (1993). 
^Citv of Newburah. 29 PERB J[3039 (1996) (CSEA retained 
exclusivity over fire dispatching duties by virtue of the fact 
that "fire dispatcher" was a title continued in CSEA's 
contractual unit description even though the position was vacant 
for 18 years/ during which time the duties were performed by fire 
fighters). 
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Finally, the record does not support CSEA's claim that the 
Teamsters only sought, and only retained, the right to the return 
of the presentence detainees and parole violators to the Holding 
Center. The record reflects that the Teamsters' representatives 
made it very clear to the County from the first that the guarding 
of the types of prisoners at issue here - pretrial and 
presentence detainees and parole violators - was the exclusive 
work of the deputy sheriffs and that the deputy sheriffs "should 
be watching them". The Teamsters agreed to work with the County 
to solve the overcrowding problem and to alleviate the strain on 
its unit employees caused by the low staffing levels and the 
mandatory overtime being worked by the deputy sheriffs. The 
temporary solution agreed to by the Teamsters and the County was 
to transfer certain prisoners to Alden, to be guarded by the 
corrections officers. We have previously held that the use of 
nonunit employees to perform unit work on a temporary basis and 
when no unit employees are available will not disturb a union's 
claim to exclusivity.-'' Therefore, the County's unilateral 
transfer of bargaining unit work to the corrections officers and 
its refusal to negotiate with the Teamsters violated §209-a.l(d) 
of the Act. 
However, the remedial order of the ALT must be modified. 
The Teamsters and the County reached an agreement in 1994 that 
-''Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of Long 
Beach, 26 PERB 5[3065 (1993) ; Spencer-Van Etten Cent. Sch. Dist., 
21 PERB ?|3015 (1988) . 
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essentially resolved this charge. Pursuant to that agreement, 
they continued to work toward a resolution of the housing and 
staffing problems underlying the charge and the County agreed 
that the work in issue was work performed exclusively by the 
employees represented by the Teamsters. In fact, in January 
1997, the County began assigning deputy sheriffs to supervise 
pretrial and presentence detainees and parole violators housed at 
Alden. Although we would ordinarily order restoration of unit 
work and order that the County negotiate in good faith with the 
Teamsters, as did the ALJ, such an order is not necessary or 
appropriate because the County and the Teamsters have agreed that 
the work is in fact the work of the deputy sheriffs and the work 
has been reassigned to the deputy sheriffs. The ALJ also ordered 
the County to make whole any deputy sheriffs for any wages or 
benefits lost as a result of the County's assignment of unit work 
to CSEA from November 1993 to the date of the order. As the 
Teamsters agreed in November 1994 that the County could continue 
to use corrections officers to supervise prisoners remanded to 
the custody of the Sheriff, the make whole order should cover 
only the period from November 1993 to the time that the Teamsters 
agreed that the County could utilize nonunit personnel, on a 
temporary basis, until the question of the deputy sheriffs' 
assignment to Alden to guard the pretrial and presentence 
detainees and parole violators was resolved. 
Based on the foregoing, CSEA's exceptions are denied and the 
decision of the ALJ is affirmed. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County and the Erie 
County Sheriff: 
1. Cease and desist from assigning nonunit employees 
to supervise pretrial and presentence detainees and 
parole violators remanded to the custody of the 
Sheriff. 
2. Make' unit employees whole for wages and benefits 
lost, if any, by the assignment of Teamsters' unit work 
to corrections officers, with interest at the maximum 
legal rate, from November 1993 to November 1994. 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
normally used to communicate information to unit 
employees. 
DATED: October 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
& (J; Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
^Marc A. Abbott, Member 

NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by Teamsters Local 264 (Teamsters) that the County of Erie and Sheriff 
of Erie County will: 
1. Not assign nonunit employees to supervise pretrial and presentence detainees and parole 
violators remanded to the custody of the Sheriff. 
2. Make unit employees whole for wages and benefits lost, if any, by the assignment of 
Teamsters' unit work to corrections officers, with interest at the maximum legal rate, from 
November 1993 to November 1994. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
COUNTY OF ERIE AND SHERIFF OF ERIE COUNTY 
ThSn Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
£>) y other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GREENBURGH NO. 11 FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
NYSUT, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
GREENBURGH NO. 11 UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (J. CHRISTOPHER MEAGHER, ESQ., CONRAD 
W. LOWER, ESQ., and JEFFREY R. CASSIDY), for Charging Party 
SHAW & PERELSON, LLP (DAVID S. SHAW Of counsel) and RUBERTI, 
GIRVIN & FERLAZZO, P.C. (E. MICHAEL RUBERTI of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by both the 
Greenburgh No. 11 Federation of Teachers, NYSUT (Federation) and 
Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free School District (District)-7 to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT). The four charges 
collectively allege that the District engaged in a multi-year, 
multi-faceted course of conduct, led by Superintendent of Schools 
Sandra Mallah, which was intended to undermine the Federation, 
remove its leadership and interfere with and discriminate against 
-'The District is a "special act" school district, created by the 
Legislature to serve emotionally handicapped children who reside 
at Children's Village (CV), a separate not-for-profit residential 
child care facility. The District is located on the CV campus. 
The CV board of trustees selects seven of its own members to 
serve as the board of education for the District. 
CASE NOS. U-16107. 
U-16481, U-17135 
and U-17530 
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its officers, activists and members for their exercise of rights 
afforded them by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
The parties7 exceptions are directed to only certain of the many 
allegations in three of these charges-7 and our discussion is 
limited accordingly. 
In relevant part, the Federation alleges in U-16107 that the 
District violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act when, effective 
in July and September 1994, a total of eight teachers, several of 
whom are Federation officers, were removed from their regular 
classroom assignments, transferred off school grounds and 
assigned to develop curriculum separately at off-site libraries 
after they had had disciplinary charges brought against them 
pursuant to Education Law §3020-a on June 22, 1994. 
Additionally, two teacher associates who had been discharged on 
June 22, 1994, were allegedly denied summer school employment 
starting in July 1994, in violation of the Act.-7 These ten 
-
7The ALJ dismissed the charge in U-1753 0 in which the Federation 
alleged that the District sent grievance information to 
individual unit employees without notice to the Federation and 
without its approval. No exceptions have been taken to the ALJ's 
decision and order in that case. 
-''The disciplinary charges and discharges, offered by the 
Federation as evidence of improper motivation, are not alleged as 
separate violations of the Act as they were implemented by the 
District in late June 1994, more than four months before 
November 4, 1994, when U-16107 was filed. 
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employees had picketed the "WAY Dinner",-; on March 10, 1994, in 
violation of a judicial restraining order and for that they were 
all held in criminal and civil contempt by judicial order and 
judgment dated June 16, 1994. The Federation alleges that the 
contempt citations were mere pretexts quickly seized upon by the 
District as an excuse to retaliate against the ten employees for 
their protected activities over the prior few years. 
In U-16481, the Federation alleges that the District 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act when, on November 11, 
1994, it discharged three more teacher associates and brought 
disciplinary charges against ten teachers^ because they were 
allegedly involved in a demonstration on June 24, 1994, outside 
i Mallah's office in the District's Leisure Building. The 
discharge of one of these teacher associates, Tyrone Galimore, 
was premised upon a second ground involving an incident Galimore 
had on August 1, 1994 with a security guard for the District. 
The Federation alleges that the June 24 demonstration and the 
August 1 incident between Galimore and the security guard were 
protected activities under the Act, which were insulated from any 
^The WAY Dinner is an event held annually by CV. Children from 
CV attend and publicly pledge allegiance to a program which aims 
to help the children stay in school and/or hold a job. It was CV 
which sought and obtained the order prohibiting picketing at the 
1994 WAY Dinner, which was held at a hotel in Tarrytown. There 
is no dispute that the WAY Dinner is a critical component of CV's 
mission. 
-/six of these teachers were already under disciplinary charges 
for their participation in the March 10 picketing of the WAY 
•
j
 Dinner. 
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disciplinary action. Alternatively, it argues that those two 
incidents, like the contempt citations arising out of the March 
10 picketing, were merely pretexts intended to disguise actions 
actually taken by the District to retaliate for the employees' 
earlier exercises of statutorily protected rights. The 
Federation also alleges in this charge that the District violated 
the Act when it made a coercive, bad faith merit pay proposal 
during negotiations on November 29, 1994, which improperly tied 
salary increases to the withdrawal of certain grievances and 
litigation. 
In U-17135, the Federation alleges that the District, on 
September 12, 1995, improperly discharged two more teacher 
associates and brought disciplinary charges against four 
additional teachers for their alleged participation in the 
June 24, 1994 demonstration. By amendment to that charge, the 
Federation alleges that the District, on December 11, 1995, 
improperly brought disciplinary charges against one additional 
teacher for his alleged participation in the June 24 
demonstration. All of the teachers who were subjected to 
Education Law §3 02 0-a disciplinary charges on November 11, 1994, 
September 12, 1995, and December 11, 1995, were, like the 
teachers charged in conjunction with the March 10 picketing, also 
suspended from regular classroom duties and privileges, 
transferred off campus, and reassigned to develop curriculum 
separately at off-site libraries. All of the teachers who were 
charged and all of the teacher associates who were discharged 
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were prohibited from entering school grounds. Each of these 
actions is alleged to have separately violated the Act. 
After twenty-three days of hearing, yielding thousands of 
transcript pages and hundreds of exhibits, the ALJ dismissed the 
charge in U-16107 arising out of the WAY Dinner picketing. The 
ALJ held that the picketing carried on by the employees in 
violation of the judicial restraining order was not an activity 
protected by the Act and that the District's personnel actions 
stemming from that picketing were not improperly motivated. In 
the latter regard, the ALT found upon credibility resolutions 
that the District acted as it did because the employees had been 
held in criminal and civil contempt of court and pursuant to 
legitimate educational and business reasons. Although the ALJ 
concluded that Mallah harbored animus against the Federation, its 
current officers and activists, he nevertheless concluded that 
neither Mallah nor any other District agent acted upon that 
animus in taking the personnel actions stemming from the WAY 
Dinner picketing. 
The ALT found to the contrary with respect to the 
disciplinary charges, discharges and related personnel actions 
taken in response to the June 24, 1994 demonstration at Mallah's 
office at issue under U-16481 and U-17135. The ALJ did not 
decide whether the June 24 demonstration was activity protected 
by the Act because he concluded that the demonstration was not 
the true reason for the District's actions, but was merely a 
pretext to discipline and discharge Federation officers and 
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activists for their previous protected activities.-7 The ALJ 
found, on credibility resolutions and from a disparity in the 
District's treatment of demonstration participants, a disparity 
which the ALJ found was rooted in the District's belief regarding 
each employee's extent of Federation activism or allegiance, that 
Mallah acted to rid the District of Federation officers and 
activists and persons who had otherwise aligned themselves in 
interest with the Federation. In net effect, the ALJ held that 
the District would not have taken the personnel actions relating 
to the June 24 demonstration but for a plan to undermine the 
Federation as it then existed. 
Galimore, as noted, had been discharged both for his alleged 
participation in the June 24 demonstration and for an altercation 
with a security guard on August 1, 1994. In the latter respect, 
the ALJ held that Galimore's actions on August 1 were protected 
as they stemmed from advice and information given by Galimore as 
a Federation representative to a unit employee at the employee's 
request and they were not of a nature which caused him to "lose" 
the protections of the Act. 
That part of U-16481 concerning the District's November 29 
merit pay proposal was dismissed. The ALJ concluded that the 
proposal, which included a page identifying the funds which were 
-''in a pretext case, the employer's asserted reasons for the 
imposition of discipline either do not exist or, as the ALJ held 
here, they are not, in fact, the actual reasons relied upon, the 
true reasons being the exercise of statutorily protected rights. 
As the discipline in a pretext case is actually based upon 
protected activities, the discipline violates the Act even if the 
employer's proffered reasons do not implicate protected 
activities. 
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"potentially available" if grievances and litigation were 
withdrawn, was not inherently coercive nor a refusal to negotiate 
in good faith. According to the ALT, the merit pay proposal was 
similar to other proposals the District had submitted to the 
Federation without objection, it was presented for "informational 
purposes" only and it did not require the withdrawal of any 
matter as a condition to negotiations on any issue. 
In their exceptions, the Federation and the District each 
appeal from the ALJ's disposition of those parts of the charges 
we have previously summarized which were adverse to their 
asserted interests. 
Repeating the pretext arguments it presented to the ALJ, the 
Federation argues that the ALJ should have found that the 
personnel actions stemming from the March 10 picketing of the WAY 
Dinner were improperly motivated. It emphasizes that the 
District's animus is evidenced and established by Mallah's 
coercive statements during tenure interviews; efforts to replace 
the Federation's leadership with persons seen by the District to 
be more moderate or more acceptable to the District; a 
negotiating strategy which included direct communications with 
unit employees, the unlawful merit pay proposal, and a deliberate 
misrepresentation of the Federation's position on the issue of 
summer pay; surveillance of lawful picketing; anti-union 
statements, including unlawful threats and promises to unit 
employees; the "gulaging" of Federation officers and activists 
effected by the personnel actions in 1994 and 1995; a total ban 
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on access by charged and discharged employees to school grounds; 
shifting explanations and rationale for the very extreme 
personnel actions which were taken; disparate discipline of 
Federation officers and agents; and Mallah's orchestration of the 
District administrators' alleged safety concerns. The Federation 
argues that the ALJ's disposition of what it characterizes as the 
"first wave" of employee removals is irrational in light of this 
evidence and in light of his finding of a violation of the Act 
regarding the "second and third waves" of removals stemming from 
the June 24, 1994 demonstration outside Mallah's office based on 
the same evidence. It argues that the ALJ also erred by failing 
to specifically find the District in violation of the Act for 
denying the employees who were charged or discharged in November 
1994 and 1995 access to the school grounds at any time. The 
Federation argues further that the ALJ's dismissal of the 
allegation concerning the merit pay proposal and his denial of 
attorney fees and litigation costs were both in error. 
The District argues that the ALJ erred as a matter of fact 
and law in finding any violations of the Act in conjunction with 
any of the personnel actions taken in response to the June 24 
demonstration at Mallah's office. It argues that the ALJ did not 
apply the proper legal standard for interference and 
discrimination violations of the Act and the burdens of proof 
accompanying those violations; that the ALJ relied on 
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inadmissible evidence of "ancient animus"-' and disregarded 
substantial, probative evidence of proper motive; that the ALJ 
drew inferences of improper motive from incorrect findings of 
fact and/or principles of law; that he erred by failing to decide 
whether the June 24 demonstration was protected activity; and 
that he failed to specify the protected activities which he found 
caused the District to retaliate against its employees. As to 
Galimore, the District argues that the ALJ erred factually and 
legally by finding Galimore's activity on August 1, 1994 to be 
protected for purposes of the Act. The District argues lastly 
under its exceptions that the ALJ's remedial order incorrectly 
covers two teachers who were subjected to Education Law §3020-a 
disciplinary charges only for their contempt of court arising 
from the March 10 picketing at the WAY Dinner, allegations which 
the ALJ dismissed. 
In response to the District's exceptions, the Federation 
argues that the ALJ's findings of fact and law regarding the 
impropriety of the personnel actions stemming from the June 24, 
1994 demonstration outside Mallah's office, and the August 1, 
-'By ancient animus, the District means any evidence of actions 
taken or statements made by the District more than four months 
before the event charged as a violation. According to the 
District, evidence outside of the "chargeable period" should not 
have been admitted to "shed light" on the District's motivation 
for actions during the chargeable period. Under the District's 
proposed evidentiary rule, nothing occurring before July 4, 1994 
should have been admitted into evidence. 
Given the basis for our disposition of these charges, we do not 
reach this issue, but note that the District's argument is 
contrary to our decisional law. See, e.g., Town of Independence, 
23 PERB f3020 (1990) (impropriety of 1987 personnel action 
properly evidenced by 1985 events). We recognize, however, that 
evidence which has little or no probative value for any reason 
may be properly excluded by an ALJ. 
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1994 incident between Galimore and the security guard, are 
correct and should be affirmed as the fact findings underlying 
his conclusions of law rest on credibility assessments. It 
asserts that the District's arguments in support of its 
exceptions are themselves either contradicted by the record or 
are merely an alternative version of the facts as found by the 
ALJ. It argues further that the ALJ did not have to decide 
whether the June 24 demonstration was activity protected under 
the Act because it was never the true reason for the District's 
personnel actions, but that the demonstration was, in any event, 
protected activity, as was Galimore's interaction with the 
security guard on August l. 
) The District in its response to the Federation's exceptions 
argues that the charges must be dismissed in their entirety on 
agency and evidence principles because there is no record 
evidence that Mallah's animus, even assuming any existed, was 
shared by or acted upon by the District's agents who investigated 
the June 24 demonstration or by its board of education, which 
allegedly made all of the personnel decisions stemming from the 
June 24 demonstration. It argues further that Mallah did not 
have any animus against the Federation, its officers or 
activists, and that she never acted upon any animus, assuming any 
was found to have existed at the relevant times. According to 
the District, the Federation's entire animus theory of violation 
is built on a false premise resting on a "post facto fiction" 
invented by the Federation to evade responsibility for the 
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employees' "abhorrent, unprofessional conduct." The District 
argues lastly that attorney fees and litigation costs are not 
appropriate in any of these cases, there being nothing to 
establish persistent, pervasive or exceptionally unlawful 
conduct. 
Having carefully reviewed the record, and having considered 
the parties7 arguments, including those at oral argument, we 
affirm the ALT's decision in part, reverse in part, and modify 
the remedial order. 
As to the allegations of impropriety arising from the March 
10 picketing of the WAY Dinner, there is an articulated 
explanation on the record for each of the actions taken by the 
District except for Mallah's decision to assign teachers to 
develop curriculum separately and in isolation from one another. 
The ALT credited the District's witnesses' explanations for 
bringing disciplinary charges against teachers, for the 
discharges of the teacher associates, the removal of the charged 
teachers from their classrooms, their transfer off school 
grounds,-' and their special assignment to a curriculum project. 
Although the ALT found that Mallah harbored animus against the 
Federation, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of fact, 
law or logic that every decision she made or caused to be made 
-
7It is somewhat unclear from the ALT's decision whether the ALT 
considered the teachers' suspensions from classroom duties and 
transfers off.campus as separate violations of the Act or only as 
evidence of improper motive. It is clear, nonetheless, that he 
considered those two actions in making his credibility 
resolutions, which were dispositive of those allegations. 
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was improperly motivated. The ALJ's decision reflects not, as 
the Federation argues, an overly simplistic acceptance of the 
District's arguments, but a careful assessment of motive in 
particular contexts, the very task he was called upon and 
expected to perform. There is no basis to reverse those 
credibility assessments simply because there is evidence in the 
record supporting a contrary assessment and conclusion. 
The ALJ found from his evaluation of the record evidence 
that the District acted in response to the March 10 picketing 
because it believed that the employees who intentionally violated 
the restraining order were no longer good role models for its 
students. Whether they were, in fact, good, bad or indifferent 
role models, or whether they were fit or unfit to teach is 
immaterial. The District's motive is controlling as to the 
allegations pertaining to the personnel actions arising from the 
March 10 picketing. The ALJ having concluded that the District 
was not improperly motivated with respect to this alleged "first 
wave" of employee removals, he correctly dismissed the 
Federation's allegations. 
The circumstances are entirely different, however, with 
respect to Mallah's separate decision to assign only one teacher 
per library. The ALJ did not address this issue in his decision 
except to the limited extent he generally held that all of the 
District's actions stemming from the March 10 picketing were 
based on legitimate educational and business reasons. There was, 
however, no reason of any kind even articulated for the decision 
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to assign only one teacher per library. Therefore, there being 
no evidence of any legitimate business or educational reason for 
the separation of the eight teachers, the ALJ's general 
conclusion that the assignment of one teacher per library was not 
improperly motivated finds no support in the record. A fortiori, 
the ALJ's decision plainly does not and cannot rest on any 
credibility assessment. We find for the following reasons that 
Mallah's decision to assign no more than one teacher per library 
was improperly motivated and, therefore, violative of §209-a.l(a) 
and (c) of the Act. 
Mallah's decision to assign individual teachers to the 
libraries to develop curriculum was wholly at odds with the 
manner in which curriculum has been developed in this District. 
Curriculum in this District has been developed, with only rare 
exception, on a collaborative basis. Moreover, the individual 
assignments admittedly presented a "real problem" for the 
District just to find enough different libraries to house the 
teachers, and the individual assignments obviously created a 
supervisory problem because supervisors had to travel to multiple 
locations to perform their functions. Also, the assignments were 
made without regard to whether the library contained materials 
relevant to the development of curriculum. Teachers, several of 
whom had many years of service, were not only isolated from each 
other, they were assigned specific seats in the libraries, 
permitted to move about only "within reason", and even then with 
a requirement that they leave their supervisors a note if they 
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were going to be away from their assigned seats. In the absence 
of any explanation for this type of assignment, and given the 
ALT's findings regarding Mallah's state of mind at the relevant 
time, the only reasonable inference which can be drawn from these 
several circumstances is that Mallah's decision in this regard 
was intended to undermine and isolate the Federation's 
leadership. That the Federation continues to function despite 
the isolation of certain of its officers and activists from one 
another is immaterial. It is enough to establish a violation of 
the Act that we find the decision to assign only one teacher per 
library was predicated upon reasons unlawful under the Act. 
The ALJ held the District in violation of the Act with 
respect to the several personnel actions taken against teachers 
and teacher associates in response to the June 24, 1994 
demonstration. He did so without deciding whether the activity 
on that date was protected under the Act, instead finding that 
the demonstration was a pretext seized upon by the District to 
effect a plan to rid itself of Federation officers and activists 
and members whom it considered to be objectionable, uncooperative 
or sympathetic to Federation goals and methods. We affirm the 
finding of violation, but upon the ground that the demonstration 
as conducted was activity protected by the Act. As such, the 
employees were insulated from any form of discipline or adverse 
consequence predicated in whole or in part upon their alleged 
participation in the demonstration, regardless of which District 
agents made the operative personnel decisions and regardless of 
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the motive underlying those decisions.-'' Therefore, the 
disciplinary charges against the teachers, the discharge of the 
teacher associates, with the exception of Galimore, and all 
related personnel actions grounded upon the June 24 demonstration 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act as they per se interfered 
with and discriminated against employees for the exercise of a 
statutorily protected right. 
In assessing the protected nature of the June 24 
demonstration, both purpose and means are relevant. The purpose 
of the demonstration, at a minimum, was to protest the June 22 
discharges of the teacher associates who had picketed the WAY 
Dinner, to protest the disciplinary charges the employees 
believed had been or would soon be filed against the teachers who 
picketed the WAY Dinner, and to support the Federation's vice-
president, who was then being questioned by Mallah and 
administrators inside Mallah's office. The purpose of the 
June 24 demonstration being clearly protected, it is only the 
means by which the demonstration was conducted which would 
deprive it of the protections of the Act. In that regard, it is 
the District which bears the burden of proof to establish that 
the activity, otherwise clearly concerted in its nature and 
protected in its purpose, must be deprived of protection because 
of the way in which it was conducted, and the District failed to 
carry that burden. 
See, e.cr. , New York City Transit Auth. , 20 PERB 53065 (1987) . 
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As noted by the ALJ, the record descriptions of the June 24 
demonstration vary greatly. The Federation argues that the 
record establishes that a peaceful assembly no more boisterous or 
disruptive than a suburban cocktail party or coffee klatch 
occurred on June 24, after the end of what was the last day of 
school. The District argues that on June 24 there occurred a 
frightening and intimidating storming of Mallah's office for 30 
to 40 minutes by an angry, violent mob of 30 to 4 0 employees who 
intended to, and did, terrorize the persons meeting in Mallah's 
office by repeated poundings on doors and windows, accompanied by 
continuous loud yelling and chanting. 
The most objective description, we believe, of the June 24 
demonstration is offered by Richard Denike, Chief of Police of 
the Irvington Police Department. Chief Denike is a veteran 
officer with more than twenty-five years of police experience. 
He, unlike all of the other witnesses who described the June 24 
demonstration, is both an entirely disinterested party, with no 
apparent motive to falsify or color his testimony, and a trained 
observer of crowd conditions. The District does not dispute the 
accuracy of Chief Denike's description of the demonstration or 
his credibility, but it argues that Chief Denike was not present 
when the "mobbing" occurred. Therefore, according to the 
District, Chief Denike's testimony is credible but irrelevant. 
The ALJ, however, placed Chief Denike "outside Mallah's door for 
most of the time," and that finding of fact, necessarily 
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reflecting the several credibility resolutions he had to make to 
make that fact finding, has clear support in the record. 
Chief Denike arrived on the school grounds before 3:00 p.m. 
with the Chief of Police of Dobbs Ferry, George Longworth—', 
whom Mallah had called prior to the demonstration and alerted to 
the possibility of "criminal activity" at 3:00 p.m. Chief Denike 
testified that he entered the Leisure Building only a minute or 
two after Chief Longworth entered, and that he stayed until the 
employees were dispersed at approximately 3:30 p.m. The 
District's own witnesses have Chief Longworth inside the building 
before 3:00 p.m. Even assuming, as seems reasonably clear from 
the record, that Chief Denike was not in the Leisure Building 
) before 3:00 p.m., the ALJ found that he was in that building, 
near Mallah's door, for almost all of the demonstration, which 
did not begin to form until approximately 3:10 p.m. As the 
record shows that the employees entered the Leisure Building at 
different stages from different places over at least several 
minutes, Chief Denike was certainly in the Leisure Building long 
enough to witness "mob action" if it had occurred in anything 
like the manner described by the District's witnesses. 
Chief Denike testified that he did not see or hear any 
pounding nor any loud screaming or chanting. Two or three 
voices, he recalled, were elevated above a conversational level, 
but whatever occurred was not enough to disturb a conversation 
—''chief Denike was returning from a conference and was sharing a 
^ ride with Chief Longworth. 
Board - U-16107, U-16481, U-17135 & U-17530 -18 
Chief Denike was having in the hallway for several minutes with 
an employee who saw him in the hallway around 3:10 p.m. In 
short, Chief Denike described an event he witnessed from 
inception or near inception which did not require police control. 
The nature of the demonstration did not require him to do 
anything other than to glance at the crowd from time to time 
simply because he did not know any of the persons gathered there 
except the employee with whom he was conversing. 
Other objective, unrebutted evidence in the record fully 
corroborates Chief Denike's description of the demonstration. 
The record shows that Chief Longworth, like Chief Denike, was 
also engaged in a social conversation of several minutes' 
duration with at least one of the demonstrators during the time 
the "mob action" was allegedly ongoing. Second, the police 
report filed by Chief Longworth after the demonstration makes no 
mention of any employee misconduct of any kind. There were no 
arrests and no injury or physical damage to person or property. 
The employees left the building at approximately 3:30 p.m., and, 
shortly later, the CV grounds entirely, immediately upon request 
by Chief Longworth. Moreover, Chief Longworth informed Mallah 
that she had to revoke the employees' permission to be in the 
building before he could direct them to leave or arrest them for 
trespassing if they did not leave the premises. If the 
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employees' conduct were as the District witnesses described,—7 
Longworth would not have waited as long as he did before removing 
the employees and he would not have needed to create a trespass 
ground for their expulsion from the premises. Moreover, 
according to Chief Denike, Chief Longworth said nothing to him 
which indicated that the employees had been angry or unruly when 
Chief Longworth and he returned to the car to leave the grounds. 
Finally, it is very significant in our opinion that the District, 
which bears the burden of proof on this issue, did not call as 
witnesses Chief Longworth or any of the other police officers who 
were present during the demonstration, even after Chief Denike 
had testified on the record early in the proceedings that the 
demonstration was not unruly and even though Chief Longworth was 
alleged to have said to Mallah and Nan Dale, Executive Director 
of CV, that the employees had been "extremely disorderly" and 
"angry". 
Just as the demonstration as conducted was variously 
described by the persons present in the hallway, the persons 
attending the meeting inside Mallah7s office on June 24 variously 
described what they heard from behind closed doors and windows 
covered with drawn blinds. The Federation's witness who attended 
the meeting testified that it was not affected at all by the 
—'The description of the demonstration by Association witnesses, 
who collectively establish that there were one or more knocks 
upon Mallah's door and some comments to the persons inside 
Mallah's office, some singly, some in unison with others in the 
group, would not render the demonstration unprotected. 
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demonstration, while District witnesses testified that the 
meeting, which appears from the record to have been substantially 
finished by the time the demonstration began, was severely 
compromised because of the fear generated by the noise of the 
demonstration. The reactions of these witnesses, however, are 
largely, if not entirely, subjective and reflect what they heard, 
not what any of them saw. Those reactions cannot be a 
determining factor in assessing whether the demonstration as 
actually conducted outside Mallah's office was protected. 
Measured objectively from Chief Denike's unrebutted testimony, 
the demonstration as conducted in the hallway was not of a nature 
that would cause a reasonable person to react as certain of the 
District witnesses said they did. 
The District argues, however, that the demonstration must 
have been more nearly as it describes because it appears from an 
exhibit in evidence that Chief Longworth called for additional 
police officers at 3:20 p.m. The two police reports in evidence 
are, however, unclear both by their own terms and in the context 
of the uncontested record facts. The first report shows Chief 
Longworth dispatched to the school at 2:18 p.m. and the second 
shows his dispatch at 3:20.p.m. The first report is obviously 
correct because the record testimony shows clearly that Chief 
Longworth was actually at Mallah's office before 3:00 p.m. on 
June 24. The record also shows that at least a detective and a 
uniformed officer were also there with Chief Longworth. The 
first report shows, moreover, that police officers were assigned 
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to be present at the school from 2:45 p.m. It is unclear, 
therefore, whether any additional police officers were actually 
dispatched at 3:20 p.m. and, if so, how many. Ultimately, 
however, this confusion is insignificant because nothing 
evidences that the dispatch of any additional officers at 
3:20 p.m. was caused by anything other than the numbers of the 
people at the scene, not what they were doing. 
According to the District, the "mob action" also included 
repeated poundings on Mallah's windows from outside the Leisure 
Building. The Federation witnesses denied any window poundings, 
but the one Federation witness who attended the meeting in 
Mallah's office testified that he heard one "tap" on Mallah's 
window, but by a person or persons who could not be seen because 
the blinds were closed. The record evidence on this aspect of 
the alleged "mobbing" fails entirely. No witnesses who testified 
could identify any unit employee even being at Mallah's windows, 
let alone responsible for any pounding or even for the one 
admitted tap.—7 In this regard, the District has only suspicion 
to support its claim that unit employees were the ones who 
repeatedly pounded on Mallah's windows, if there was pounding. 
Even if we were to conclude that there was, in fact, pounding on 
—'There was hearsay testimony that one of the administrators who 
attended the meeting, who was not called to testify, saw one 
teacher at Mallah's window at the time the window was struck. 
The teacher identified through that hearsay statement testified, 
and he denied being with the group of employees who gathered at 
the side of the Leisure Building containing Mallah's office 
windows and denied striking any of those windows. 
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Mallah's window, there is no record evidence establishing that 
any unit employees did it. Suspicion cannot suffice to satisfy 
the District's burden to show that the demonstration should be 
removed from the scope of the Act's protection. 
Even if we were to assume that there were, as the District 
claims, several poundings on Mallah's window(s), and were to 
further assume that the hearsay testimony placing a teacher at 
the window was both true and proved, despite the teacher's 
denial, that he was the person who pounded, and assume also that 
the window pounding was not protected activity, our result in 
these cases would be no different. 
Window pounding is a clearly isolated part of the June 24 
demonstration which would not deny the protections of the Act to 
the persons who participated in or were present during the 
demonstration as otherwise conducted inside or outside the 
Leisure Building. Even upon the multiple assumptions stated 
above, the District would be at best privileged under the Act, as 
it is, for example, with Galimore's August 1 altercation with the 
security guard, discussed next, to discipline employees only for 
the discrete act of window pounding. The disciplinary charges 
and discharges we order rescinded are not restricted to that 
narrow ground, but rest generally on the employees' alleged 
involvement with the demonstration. We express no opinion as to 
whether disciplinary action narrowly premised on this specific 
misconduct ground alone would violate the Act as that issue is 
not presented in these cases. 
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As the ALT noted in his decision, Galimore was discharged 
both for his participation in the June 24 demonstration and for 
an incident with a security guard on August 1, 1994. The ALJ 
concluded that Galimore retained protected status on August 1, 
stemming from his role as a Federation officer and agent in 
giving advice to a unit employee upon request of the employee 
about whether the employee had to accept service of a restraining 
order after working hours. The ALJ also concluded that Galimore 
had not "lost" his protected status because the security guard 
had "escalated the situation". The issue is different in our 
view. 
Questions as to who started the confrontation and who 
escalated it have bearing on whether there is cause for 
discipline and the proper disciplinary penalty, if any, but those 
questions are not relevant to an assessment of whether Galimore 
was engaged in statutorily protected activity. Whatever 
protected right Galimore may have had to give advice to the unit 
employee upon the request of that employee, his protected 
activity clearly ended with the rendering of that advice. The 
verbal, and possible physical confrontation which occurred after 
the representational activity had concluded, no matter who may 
have caused it or who may have escalated it, was wholly personal 
in nature and divorced from any representational capacity 
Galimore may have held earlier. Although it is sometimes 
difficult to draw a bright line between protected 
representational activity and unprotected personal activity, that 
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line is clear as to the portion of this August 1 incident which 
is the subject of the disciplinary action. Established on this 
record are actions on that date of two individuals angered by and 
reacting to verbal and physical taunts and challenges. 
Subjecting Galimore's conduct on August 1 to disciplinary action 
was, therefore, not in violation of the Act on a per se 
basis.—7 Although the portion of the August 1 incident giving 
rise to the disciplinary charge was not protected activity, 
Galimore's discipline upon this ground would nevertheless violate 
the Act if the incident were a pretext to retaliate against 
Galimore for actions he or others may have taken at other times 
which were protected. Having addressed the protected nature of 
) the August 1 activity, and given the ALJ's analytical approach, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the ALT found implicitly that 
the August 1 incident was not pretextual. We agree with that 
conclusion. 
We express no opinion, of course, as to whether the August 1 
incident is cause for Galimore's discipline, only that discipline 
upon this ground did not violate the Act. The same is true for 
those employees charged and discharged in conjunction with the 
March 10 picketing of the WAY Dinner. Whether there are grounds 
for the discipline of any of those employees, and, if so, what 
the appropriate penalty should be, are issues for determination 
elsewhere. 
—
70ur conclusion in this regard affects the remedy, an issue 
discussed infra. 
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The ALT's dismissal of the allegation concerning the 
November 29, 1994 merit pay proposal is affirmed for the reasons 
set forth in the ALT's decision. 
Five remedial issues remain for discussion. 
First, attorney fees and litigation costs were properly 
denied by the ALJ as the limited circumstances for the grant of 
that extraordinary remedy are not present in these cases, there 
being no persistent, pervasive or exceptionally unlawful 
conduct. — ' 
Second, both parties are in agreement that Thomas Beldino 
and Reginald Skinner were not issued disciplinary charges in 
conjunction with the June 24, 1994 demonstration, only in 
conjunction with the March 10 picketing, allegations which the 
ALJ dismissed. Therefore, the remedial order does not properly 
include those two teachers. 
Third, all of the teachers who were subjected to 
disciplinary charges for their participation in the June 24 
demonstration were ordered by the ALJ restored to their "regular 
classroom duties and assignments, as existed prior to the 
issuance of said charges." Six of those teachers, however, had 
been removed from their regular classroom assignments and 
reassigned off campus to curriculum duties pursuant to the 
disciplinary charges brought against them because they had been 
found guilty of contempt for their disobedience of the judicial 
Town of Henrietta, 28 PERB ^3079 (1995). 
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order restraining the March 10 picketing at the WAY Dinner. The 
ALJ found no violation of the Act with respect to the personnel 
actions stemming from the March 10 picketing. Therefore, the ALJ 
did not intend this part of the order to rescind any of the 
personnel actions taken pursuant to the first set of disciplinary 
charges. As the ALJ's order as written, however, is susceptible 
to that erroneous interpretation, we have modified the remedial 
order to limit it to those teachers not under disciplinary 
charges stemming from the March 10 picketing. 
Fourth, Galimore was discharged for his alleged 
participation in the June 24 demonstration and for the August 1 
incident with the security guard. The first activity is 
protected but the second is not. Discipline grounded upon the 
first activity violates the Act and must be rescinded. It cannot 
be determined, however, whether the District would have 
disciplined or discharged Galimore for the August 1 incident 
alone. Therefore, the appropriate order is one rescinding the 
discharge as and to the extent it is grounded upon Galimore's 
alleged involvement in the June 24 demonstration and directing 
the District to reconsider disciplinary action against Galimore 
for the August 1 incident without regard to the June 24 
demonstration. Galimore, moreover, is properly excluded from 
that part of our order requiring reinstatement with back pay of 
the teacher associates who were discharged only because of their 
alleged participation in the June 24 demonstration. 
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Fifth, our order that the District annul and rescind the 
assignment of one teacher per work location to develop curriculum 
applicable to those teachers charged in conjunction with the 
March 10 picketing does not require that those eight teachers be 
restored to regular classroom duties, be reassigned on campus, be 
relieved of curriculum assignments or be assigned to work 
locations in any particular numbers or groups, only that they 
cannot be assigned to develop curriculum one teacher per work 
location. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District is held to 
have violated §2 09-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act by issuing Education 
Law §3 020-a charges, by discharging employees, and by taking 
related personnel actions for any employee's alleged involvement 
in the June 24, 1994 demonstration. The District also violated 
§209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act by assigning the eight teachers 
charged in conjunction with the March 10 picketing of the WAY 
Dinner to develop curriculum separately. The improper practice 
charges are otherwise dismissed and the ALJ's decision, except as 
reversed or modified herein, is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
1. Annul and rescind the assignment of one teacher per 
work location to develop curriculum as to those 
teachers issued Education Law §302 0-a charges arising 
from the March 10, 1994 picketing of the WAY Dinner. 
2. Annul and rescind all pending Education Law §3020-a 
charges issued to any unit employees relating to the 
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June 24, 1994 demonstration at the Leisure Building, 
making such employees whole for wages and benefits 
lost, if any, due to any personnel actions grounded 
upon the June 24, 1994 demonstration, with interest at 
the currently prevailing maximum legal rate, and remove 
all materials pertaining to the June 24, 1994 
demonstration from these employees' personnel or other 
employment files. 
3. Annul and rescind the discharge of teacher associates 
Marilyn Stewart, Joan O'Leary, Christopher Sartory and 
Matthew Magee, offer reinstatement to these employees 
and make them whole for any wages and benefits lost due 
to their discharge from the date of their discharge to 
the effective date of the offer of reinstatement, 
whether or not accepted, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate, and remove all materials 
which pertain to the June 24, 1994 demonstration from 
these employees' personnel or other employment files. 
4. Annul and rescind the discharge of teacher associate 
Tyrone Galimore as and to the extent his discharge was 
grounded upon his alleged participation in the June 24, 
1994 demonstration, remove all materials pertaining 
thereto from his personnel or other employment files, 
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6. 
and reconsider the discipline previously imposed upon 
him without regard to his alleged participation in the 
June 24, 1994 demonstration. 
Restore Clement Alutto, James Brogan, Deborah Kiely, 
Charles Manna, Hedwig Broetz, Kevin Burns, Dennis 
Mosblech, Rich Rowlands and Milton Cobb to the duties, 
rights and privileges as existed for them prior to the 
issuance of Education Law §3020-a charges against them 
and restore Marilyn Stewart, Joan O'Leary, Christopher 
Sartory and Matthew Magee to the duties, rights and 
privileges as existed for them prior to the date of 
their discharge. 
Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations ordinarily used to post notices of 
information to Federation unit employees. 
DATED: October 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Pai iline R. Kinsella, ( JLi4_ Chairperson 
Marcf A. Abbott, Member 
) 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the units represented by the Greenburgh No. 11 Federation of Teachers, NYSUT, that the 
Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free School District will: 
1. Annul and rescind the assignment of one teacher per work location to develop curriculum as to those teachers issued 
Education Law §3020-a charges arising from the March 10, 1994 picketing of the WAY Dinner. 
2. Annul and rescind all pending Education Law §3020-a charges issued to any unit employees relating to the June 24, 
1994 demonstration at the Leisure Building, making such employees whole for wages and benefits lost, if any, due 
to any personnel actions grounded upon the June 24,1994 demonstration, with interest at the currently prevailing 
maximum legal rate, and remove all materials pertaining to the June 24,1994 demonstration from these employees' 
personnel or other employment files. 
Annul and rescind the discharge of teacher associates Marilyn Stewart, Joan O'Leary, Christopher Sartory and 
Matthew Magee, offer reinstatement to these employees and make them whole for any wages and benefits lost due 
to their discharge from the date of their discharge to the effective date of the offer of reinstatement, whether or not 
accepted, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate, and remove all materials which pertain to the 
June 24, 1994 demonstration from these employees' personnel or other employment files. 
4. Annul and rescind the discharge of teacher associate Tyrone Galimore as and to the extent his discharge was 
grounded upon his alleged participation in the June 24,1994 demonstration, remove all materials pertaining thereto 
from his personnel or other employment files, and reconsider the discipline previously imposed upon him without 
regard to his alleged participation in the June 24, 1994 demonstration. 
5. Restore Clement Alutto, James Brogan, Deborah Kiely, Charles Manna, Hedwig Broetz, Kevin Burns, Dennis 
Mosblech, Rich Rowlands and Milton Cobb to the duties, rights and privileges as existed for them prior to the 
issuance of Education Law §3020-a charges against them and restore Marilyn Stewart, Joan O'Leary, Christopher 
Sartory and Matthew Magee to the duties, rights and privileges as existed for them prior to the date of their discharge. 
Dated By , 
(Representative) (Title) 
GREENBURGH NO. 11 UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PENFIELD PARAPROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION, 
NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4657 
PENFIELD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted'in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Penfield Paraprofessional 
Organization, NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and regular part-time (at least 
.5 or greater) Teaching Assistants and those 
full and regular part-time Teacher Aides 
assigned to classroom instructional duties. 
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Excluded: All non-classroom Teacher Aides, all less than 
.5 part-time Teaching Assistants and Teacher 
Aides, all supervisors and all other employees 
of the District. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Penfield Paraprofessional 
Organization, NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: October 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kins-ella, Chairperson 
'Marc A.^Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
EAST ISLIP TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4672 
EAST ISLIP UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the East Islip Teachers' 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Security Guards 
Excluded: Security Coordinator and all others. 
Certification C-4672 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the East Islip Teachers' 
Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: October 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
ft 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
L 
/ 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4685 
TOWN OF AURORA, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Motor Equipment Operator, Truck Driver, 
Laborer, Working Crew Chief. 
Certification - C-4685 - 2 -
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
ku/L- i h^J 
Paul ine R. K inse l l a , CKaTirperson 
Marc A. Abbot t ,Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of . 
JEFFERSON COUNTY ROAD PATROL DEPUTY 
SHERIFFS, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4566 
JEFFERSON COUNTY and JEFFERSON COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Employer, 
- and -
JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 3 089, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Jefferson County Road Patrol 
Deputy Sheriffs- has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
found to be appropriate and described below, as their exclusive 
-' " The incumbent employee organization, the Jefferson County 
Deputy Sheriffs Association, Local 3089, expressed no 
interest in participating in any election. 
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representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Deputy Sheriff, Deputy Sheriff (Detective) and 
Deputy Sheriff (Sergeant). 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Jefferson County Road 
Patrol Deputy Sheriffs. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: October 9, 1997 
Albany, New York 
wJt~ X- KM^U 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
